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Introduction 
Given the distance from power for some stakeholders, ensuring that relevant interests are 
represented in global venues is a considerable governance challenge (Stiglitz, 2003, p. 61). 
Stakeholder inclusion, or ‘inclusiveness’, is a critical aspect of interest representation at the 
global level, and varies greatly depending on the institutional context in question (Koenig-
Archibugi, 2006, p. 13). There has been recognition for some time that globalization, and the 
post-modern experiences of complex governance it has brought about, requires a 
reconfiguration of interest representation in contemporary public administration (Rhodes, 
1997, p. 198). In the supra-national polity of the EU, for example, inclusiveness has been 
identified as a fundamental principle of ‘good’ governance and legitimacy (Schmidt, 2013, 
pp. 2-3; Smismans, 2004, p. 26). 
 
Governance scholars have broken down inclusiveness into two concepts: weight and access. 
‘Weight’, which may be linked to the notion of equality, implies the degree of influence that 
participants are able to exert in a given policy context: the more balanced the power, the 
greater the equality between participants. ‘Access’ denotes the range of stakeholders, and the 
amount of influence they may exert in policy content-development. Governance systems can 
therefore be determined to be inclusive when stakeholders are not only involved in decision-
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making, but their input is both formally and informally acknowledged in actual policy 
(Koenig-Archibugi, 2006, pp. 14-15). It is argued that interest representation is most 
inclusive when previously excluded, or marginalized voices and perspectives, are actively 
encouraged (Young, 2000, p. 8). This work on governance dovetails with the recent 
‘procedural turn’ in the literature on climate justice. This new area of ethical focus eschews 
commentary on the equitable distribution of mitigation/adaptation costs and benefits, instead 
exploring fair terms for international discourse and the procedural justice required by ‘public 
reason’, whereby nations develop through norms, principles and policies through fair terms 
of deliberation (Boran, 2016; Boran & Katz, 2017; Breakey, 2015). 
 
Seeking the involvement of such interests has little meaning if the resources for their 
participation are not available. Traditionally, it is only the most well-resourced organisations 
that have the capacity to attend and be involved in global policy deliberations. This limitation 
may be mitigated if there are compensating opportunities from groups to collaborate. In this 
regard, the growth of network-models of governance has been seen as providing a degree of 
compensation for those groups that cannot attend global (international) venues of power – 
such as the UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP). This is, of course, contingent on the 
resourcing of those networks through which the absent interests are represented (Scholte, 
2004, pp. 223-225). 
 
Scholars identify a wide range of resources required for effective interest representation. 
Clearly, economic resources are required (for such basic necessities as travel, food and 
accommodation). Technical capacity (including know-how, experience and expertise) is also 
important, as is institutional support (Mason, 1999, pp. 72-73). These have all been identified 
as structural framework conditions for the development of good (effective) environmental 
policy for quite some time (Janicke, 1992; Jänicke, 1996).  Beyond the need for economic, 
technical and institutional capacity-building, there is also a need for the appropriate 
distribution of the monetary and non-monetary benefits created by the implementation of 
those policies in order for governance systems to function effectively. These factors are 
pronounced during policy formulation, such as has been observed in the policy arena of 
emissions reduction activities such as REDD+. Finally, benefit sharing throws up its own 
governance challenges, particularly in terms of who receives those benefits (Chapman, 
Wilder, & Millar, 2014, p. 271). 
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While international climate initiatives can be seen to be inclusive of various stakeholder 
interests, the allocation of resources to facilitate their active participation continues to be 
problematic. Previous studies suggesting the existence of a ‘South/North’ divide in global 
climate governance appear to be confirmed, although this observation is qualified. These 
findings have implications for the future implementation of activities aimed at reducing 
global greenhouse gas emissions under the 2015 Paris Agreement, and for any new market 
mechanisms that eventuate, notably the so-called ‘sustainable development mechanism’ 
(SDM). 
 
This chapter presents a synthesis of findings from quantitative and qualitative investigations 
of the perspectives of participants involved in international climate governance, conducted 
over the period 2010-2015. In this study, an established framework of principles, criteria and 
indicators (PC&I) for institutional governance was applied to two mechanisms under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): the initiative 
referred to as ‘Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of 
conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest stocks in 
developing countries’ (REDD+); and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the 
Kyoto Protocol (KP). Assessment focuses on the governance value of interest representation 
in terms of inclusiveness (access) and resources (allocation). It begins by outlining the 
historical context of UNFCCC, as well as CDM and REDD+, and continues with a 
delineation of the methods adopted, and results to reveal a relatively consistent set of results 
across the elements investigated, with inclusiveness receiving the highest score of all the 
governance indicators, and resources the lowest. The CDM was the weakest performer. 
 
Challenges confronting climate governance 
A range of academics and commentators has pointed to governance problems with the 
programmes and mechanisms of international climate governance (Cadman, 2013; Forsyth, 
2009; Hoffmann, 2011; Knieling & Leal Filho, 2012; Lederer, 2011; Lyster, 2011; 
Thompson, Baruah, & Carr, 2011). Both CDM and REDD+ have been identified as sites of 
political negotiation and contestation, wherein politically charged concepts such as 
environmental integrity and equity become turned into technical matters, referred to as 
‘governing by expertise’ (Dooley & Gupta, 2017). The role of governance, notably in the 
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CDM, has been linked to the political-economic context in which projects are operating; this 
in turn heavily influences the quality of the outcomes generated, particularly in developing 
countries, where there is a need to broaden the capacity of projects to improve their 
effectiveness (Newell, 2009). Governance has been the focus of several hundred academic 
papers on REDD+ (Cadman, Maraseni, Breakey, López-Casero, & Ma, 2016), particularly 
regarding the vexed issue of how to share the benefits derived from reducing emissions 
(Chapman, Maguire, Doshi, Kago, Aquino, Kiguatha, Dooley, & Engbring, 2015; Chapman 
et al., 2014; Chapman, Wilder, Millar, Dibley, Yeang, Heffernan, Sherchan, Maguire, Kago, 
Kamunde-Aquino, Kiguatha, Yvonne Nana Afua, Doshi, Engbring, & Dooley, 2015; Harada, 
Prabowo, Aliadi, Ichihara, & Ma, 2015; McGregor, Weaver, Challies, Howson, Astuti, & 
Haalboom, 2014). According to commentators and scholars, the so-called ‘North South 
divide’ between developed and developing countries has been exacerbated in international 
climate governance due to arguments around the use of forest carbon under CDM and 
REDD+ (Abreu Mejía, 2010; Allan & Dauvergne, 2013; Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2007; 
Roberts & Parks, 2006). Given the significant scale of finance for REDD ‘readiness’, and the 
potential for results-based payments to generate similar levels of funding, it may be better to 
call this a ‘South North divide’, as significant resources are flowing from developed to 
developing countries, with concomitant impact on perceptions of both REDD+ and CDM 
(Cadman, 2013).  
 
The investigation below evaluates CDM and REDD+ against a comprehensive set of 
governance values, but concentrates largely on the nature of interest representation, and the 
related concepts of access (understood in terms of the inclusiveness of governance 
structures), and allocation (understood in terms of the provision of resources, capacity 
building and benefit sharing). It looks at the views of a range of participants, but focuses 
especially on evaluating these perceptions from developed and developing country 
perspectives.  
 
Key developments and policies: overview   
 
Background: UNFCCC and its institutional arrangements for climate governance 
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The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) entered into 
force in 1994 and with the aim of preventing ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system’ (Article 2), and is one of the most concrete outcomes of the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). The Convention was initially 
operationalized via the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (KP) in a time when the market- and political 
ideology of neo-liberalism was in its ascendency. The Kyoto Protocol’s market emphasis was 
demonstrated by its three main policy instruments (or ‘flexible mechanisms’) aimed at 
mitigating emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) via the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), allowing developed countries to ‘offset’ their emissions via projects in developing 
countries, Joint Implementation (JI), a similar model aimed at economies in transition to a 
market economy, and  International Emissions Trading (IET), which was an attempt to link 
all these activities within an international carbon offsetting economy. The European Union 
was the first collective polity to enter into the system in 2005 through its own Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which from 2008 permitted the purchase of ‘carbon credits’  
(referred to as certified emissions reductions, or CERs) from projects established under the 
CDM, as well as JI projects (Cadman, 2013; Cadman, Eastwood, Michaelis, Maraseni, 
Pittock, & Sarker, 2015).  
 
The significance of the Kyoto Protocol was that it stipulated a target that was legally binding 
for the reduction of greenhouse gases (most notably carbon dioxide) of a minimum of 5.2 
percent over the timeframe of 2008-2012, using 1990 as a reference level. The CDM is the 
only one of the three mechanisms that can be said to be genuinely global in its institutional 
expression (Maraseni & Cadman, 2015). This is because it transfers both technology as well 
as direct project finance from developing countries (referred to as ‘Annex I’) to developing 
(or ‘Non-annex’) countries. The underlying principles were that developed countries could 
enable sustainable development (an objective of UNCED) by facilitating the exchange 
(offsetting) of emissions from private sector industry via projects in developing countries 
(thereby meeting their own national greenhouse gas reduction targets), and removing 
atmospheric pollution that would not have happened without such initiatives (a Kyoto 
Protocol requirement referred to as ‘additionality’). The first CDM project was registered in 
2004 in Brazil, with the number of activities registered growing from 62 to over 7,000 
between 2005 and the end of the commitment period, offsetting over one billion tonnes of 
carbon.  Reducing, or avoiding emitting activities (referred to as ‘mitigation’) was initially 
the primary focus of activities under the Convention, but this changed over the period 2001-
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2006, between Conference of Parties (COP) 7 (Marrakesh) and COP 12 (Nairobi), as 
developing countries began to focus on their exposure (or vulnerability) to climate change, 
and the costs that coping with (referred to as ‘adaptation’) climate change would entail.  
 
As a result, climate change began to be reframed as not just an environmental issue, but a 
social one as well, which needed the provision of resources, usually financial, and often 
somewhat euphemistically referred to as ‘capacity building’. While this change in emphasis 
did not particularly affect how countries began implementing the Kyoto Protocol, it 
introduced a lack of certainty into the negotiations about what the policy settings would look 
like after 2012, and the extent to which market mechanisms would continue to be used for 
mitigation activities. Beyond what might be interpreted as an attempt to merely gain extra 
funds from developed countries was the inherent problem that the Kyoto Protocol only 
focused on developed countries’ obligations, while several countries – most notably China 
and India, the largest beneficiaries of CDM projects to the virtual exclusion of all others – 
changed their developmental status over the period, yet remained outside any of the 
protocol’s emissions reductions commitments (Cadman, Eastwood et al. 2015). In other 
words, the CDM’s aim was to serve as a mechanism for aiding sustainable development 
through financial transfer from high income and high emitting countries to low income and 
low emitting countries. However, as India and (especially) China moved out of the latter 
category, the mechanism became increasingly untenable. 
 
This underlying tension came to boil in 2010 at COP 15 (Copenhagen), where there were 
overly-optimistic expectations for a legally binding new arrangement, but which ultimately 
failed to deliver anything except a commitment for the Kyoto Protocol to continue in some 
form, and the vague idea that all countries might reduce emissions through what were 
referred to as ‘intended nationally determined contributions’ (INDCs)  (Radunsky, 2017). 
The policy uncertainties generated prior to the expiration of the Kyoto Protocol commitment 
period resulted in the CDM being declared to be ‘imperilled’ (CDM-Policy-Dialogue, 2012a, 
p. (a)2), with further predictions at the time that “if nations permit the CDM mechanism to 
disintegrate, the political consensus for truly global carbon markets may evaporate” (CDM-
Policy-Dialogue, 2012b, p. (b)). Nevertheless, at COP 18 in 2012 the ‘Doha’ amendment 
(DA) to the Kyoto Protocol resulted in agreement for a second commitment period from 
2013-2020, during which the (by now) 38 signatories would implement emissions reductions 
of 18 per cent. In terms of total emissions globally, however, it should be stressed that the 
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Doha Amendment addresses a mere 15 per cent of emissions, and a number of the original 
signatories to the protocol did not sign up (Maguire, 2015). With the recognition implicit in 
Doha Amendment that erstwhile developing countries also had obligations to reduce 
emissions, new meaning was given to the UN norm of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ (CBDR) between developing and developed countries, and the notion of a 
‘new market mechanism’ began to gain traction, which might redefine the CDM to include 
developing countries, whilst continuing to serve developed countries’ interests. However, 
there were two hurdles to overcome. The first was in some regions there was an ideological 
rejection of neo-liberal market mechanisms (especially in Latin America). The second was 
the growing attraction of financing emissions reductions from improved forest management 
activities, which had been largely excluded from the CDM, which focussed on planted 
forests, rather than dealing with deforestation and forest degradation for logging activities in 
natural forests (Cadman 2015).  
 
This was a deliberate omission on behalf of the CDM, which had been under pressure from 
NGOs in the early days of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations not to include forests. In 2005, the 
idea of ‘reducing emissions from deforestation’ (RED) entered the climate negotiations in the 
form of an emerging policy discussion. This effectively reinserted forests into the mitigation 
negotiations, and the proposed mechanism and related programme evolved over time to 
include ‘reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation’ (REDD), to REDD-
‘plus’ at COP 15, to include other non-forestry activities. The idea behind the initiative was 
to combat forest loss by providing funds to forest actors (largely in the developing and 
tropical rainforest countries) to reduce their impacts by managing forests more sustainably, 
either through conservation measures, maintaining or enhancing stocks of carbon, or reducing 
logging impacts. This would provide funds for developing countries and at the same time 
allow developed countries to continue offsetting their own emissions through some form of 
carbon trade, but discussions as to how this might occur have constantly changed over time 
(de Oliveira, Cadman, Ma, Maraseni, Koli, Jadhav, & Prabowo, 2013). Rather than 
delivering tangible results on the ground, payments that have been made to date have been 
focused largely on assisting developing countries “in building their capacity to benefit from 
possible future systems of positive incentives for REDD+” (FCPF, 2017).  
 
The initiative, referred to in climate negotiations under the long title of “Reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable 
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management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries”, is 
supported by a range of UN-affiliated entities. A support agency, UN-REDD, provides help 
to identified countries during the introduction of the programme, referred to as ‘REDD+ 
readiness’, through a number of regional and global funds allocated by donor countries. 
UNREDD operates in collaboration with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN 
Environment Programme (UNEP), and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) (UN-
REDD, 2009). The UN also operates a Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MTFO) which 
allocates and tracks the use of developed country donations, which are distributed through a 
number of specific programmatic funds, which between 2008 and 2017 totaled more than 
USD $3.5 billion. EU countries provided a significant proportion of money, as well as 
Canada, Japan, and Switzerland. Norway is one of the largest individual donor countries.1 
The World Bank also plays a role, via its Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), and 
manages two funds – the Readiness Fund, which complements UN-REDD support, and the 
Carbon Fund, which develops funding arrangements for the future possible purchase and 
trade of emissions reductions. As an institution, FCPF is made up of country donors, NGOs, 
and the private sector, and concentrates on the more technical requirements or REDD+, 
including Readiness Preparation Proposals (RPPs) and Emissions Reduction Programs 
(ERPs) Pledges and allocated funds have exceeded $1 billion so far (FCPF, 2017). 
 
A range of further agreements has been negotiated between developed and developing 
countries under the auspices of the climate negotiations. In 2009 the Copenhagen Accord of 
COP 15 stipulated that a tranche of funds from the $100 billion allocated to climate change 
management should go to emissions reduction activities in forests (Maraseni & Cadman, 
2015). Donating and accounting for such potentially large funds poses a number of 
governance challenges for the donor and recipient countries, as recognised in Cancún in 
2010, at COP 16. Parties to the Convention agreed to the creation of “guidance and 
safeguards” to ensure the “transparent and effective national forest governance”, including 
the “full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular indigenous peoples 
and local communities”, with the usual caveat that this was conditional on “national 
legislation and sovereignty” (UNFCCC, 2011, p. 26). The negotiations further recognise that 
“land tenure issues, forest governance issues, [and] gender” need to be taken into 
consideration (Article 72). Additional efforts to safeguard the needs of stakeholders were 
                                                          
1 See http://mptf.undp.org/tools/search?q=REDD&qc=project (accessed 08/09/2017). 
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announced by the REDD+ related agencies themselves in 2011 at COP 17 in Durban, and a 
number of guidelines were released (FCPF, 2011; UN-REDD, 2012). Together, these 
governance provisions were further systematized at COP 19, 2013 via the Warsaw 
Framework for REDD+ (UNFCCC, 2014). The otherwise unstoppable policy momentum of 
the initiative was briefly checked in Lima 2014 during COP 20, which may be attributed to 
Parties hedging their bets in anticipation of the outcomes of the forthcoming Paris COP 
(2015), where the fate of the CDM, and future market mechanisms was expected to be 
determined (Radunsky, 2017).  
 
The top-down model of the Kyoto Protocol was considerably altered under the Paris 
Agreement (PA) of 2015, which places much greater emphasis on the role of the private 
sector, civil society and voluntary approaches. Although nation states continue to have a 
range of responsibilities around monitoring and reporting of their activities, these 
requirements fall under the commitments pledged under the framework of each country’s 
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) (Glynn, 2017). The ‘bottom-up’ philosophy of 
the Paris Agreement is likely to have major implications for the future of both the CDM and 
REDD+. Although Article 5 confirms the “existing framework” by which REDD+ functions, 
as well the continuation of “results-based payments” for emissions reduction it also calls for 
“alternative policy approaches” (UNFCCC, 2015, p. 22). It is possible that this may be an 
oblique reference to the concept “internationally transferred mitigation outcomes” (ITMOs) 
of Article 6 (6.2 and 6.3 specifically). Under Article 6.4, the Agreement appears to pave the 
way for the trading of ITMOs by means of what is referred to as a “mechanism to contribute 
to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development” 
(unofficially referred to as the ‘sustainable development mechanism’ – SDM). But there is no 
specific reference to the CDM, and its fate remains unclear (UNFCCC, 2015, p. 23).  
 
Decoupling the SDM and REDD+ via two discrete Articles under the Agreement reflects the 
conflict amongst Parties over whether there should continue to be a role for voluntary 
market-based approaches to reducing emissions, or whether there should be greater 
government regulation and by means of non-market measures. Although the viability of the 
international carbon market continues to be elusive, there continue to be Parties who are 
pushing for one, despite the on-going lack of certainty that the Paris Agreement will provide 
for one. There is obviously a market linkage underpinning the push for the SDM. However, 
there is still no agreement as to whether it will complement, or completely replace, the CDM 
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(CIFOR, 2017). What is clear is that all Parties continue to support REDD+. The division 
between Articles 5 and 6 allows the possibility for an international mechanism to allow for 
forest-based carbon offsets, while not specifically alluding to them. It is likely that future 
negotiations will focus on whether whatever mechanism emerges will simply focus on 
REDD+ projects and payments on the basis of their results, or whether there will be a space 
for other initiatives that will also lead to some form of offsets (GRET, 2016).  
 
While REDD+ has its detractors, particularly amongst environmental NGOs, it seems to have 
avoided some of the hostility directed to the CDM historically. The CDM had a number of 
major design faults in its early days, notably the exploitation of the ‘potency’ of certain 
gasses by refrigerator factories in China, who switched technologies and were able to sell 
their resulting hydroflourocarbon savings as offsets for extremely high prices. Of equal 
concern was the accreditation of a large number of dam construction projects for 
hydroelectric power, which proceeded largely without the full, prior, and informed consent 
(FPIC) of local and indigenous communities, and neglected to put in place effective benefit 
sharing arrangements with affected parties (Cadman et al., 2015, pp. 29-30). Civil society 
organisations strenuously opposed many of these activities, but it took the CDM until 2014, 
two years after the official end of the first Kyoto Protocol commitment period, to provide 
guidance on stakeholder consultation under the mechanism (Cadman et al., 2015, p. 50). It 
might be possible to conclude that  the focus on safeguards in REDD+ reflects a degree of 
policy learning from the early days of the CDM, and a desire to ensure better stakeholder 
participation and coordination (Fujisaki, Hyakumura, Scheyvens, & Cadman, 2016). REDD+ 
has nevertheless been unable to avoid criticism entirely, as the nation-state sovereignty 
provisions of its various agreements continue to create tensions with non-state actors 
concerning unresolved issues around land tenure and indigenous rights. In addition, there is 
the even greater uncertainty as to whether the programme is even capable of contributing 
meaningfully to keeping global temperatures within the 1.5-2⁰C target specified under Paris 
(Chokkalingam & Vanniarachchy, 2011; McAfee, 2016).  
 
Key Approaches and Method 
While ‘governance’ itself may be seen as a neutral term concerning the structures and 
processes used for steering and coordinating stakeholder interactions within institutions, 
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‘good’ governance has been linked to a wide range of moral, ethical and normative values. 
The ‘thicker’, or more comprehensive these values, it is argued, the greater the effectiveness 
of the climate regime as an integrity system, and the more substantial its institutional integrity 
and overall legitimacy (Breakey, Cadman, & Sampford, 2017). ‘Institutional integrity’ in this 
context refers to the ongoing capability of the institution to reliably live up to its publicly 
stated ideals and goals – its ‘Public Institutional Justification’ (Breakey, Cadman, & 
Sampford, 2015). By improving the depth and quality of the interaction between institutional 
actors and stakeholders in the wider environment, the achievement of thick governance 
values attends to a lynchpin part (the ‘context integrity’) of an institution’s pursuit of 
integrity (Breakey et al., 2015; Breakey et al., 2017). In developing a comprehensive set of 
governance values, and understanding their relationship one to another for evaluation 
purposes, the researchers have synthesized the work of scholars from the fields of 
international relations, public administration, comparative politics and environmental policy 
(Cadman, 2011, pp. 5-18). The researchers particularly acknowledge the pioneering work of 
Lammerts van Bueren and Blom (Lammerts van Bueren and Blom 1997). 
 
In order to understand how the various institutional arrangements for good governance relate 
one to another, a hierarchically consistent framework of principles, criteria and indicators 
(PC&I), drawn from the literature, was used. Consistency allows for the appropriate location 
of elements within the framework, avoiding overlap or duplication at another level, and 
enabling a ‘top-down’ analysis from principles to criteria and thence to indicators. A 
principle expresses a specific value. Criteria function at the next level down, and categorise 
aspects of a principle. Like principles, criteria are not measured directly but are used to 
determine the degree of compliance with the principle. They are connected to indicators that 
are hierarchically lower, and denote quantitative or qualitative parameters. Indicators (as they 
relate to the relevant criterion, and larger principle) can then be used for measurement – in 
this case measures of the quality of governance. Standards are a set of PC&I that serve as a 
basis for monitoring and reporting, or as a reference for assessment of conditions ‘on the 
ground’ – in this case, how governance is expressed at any institutional level (Lammerts van 
Bueren and Blom 1997: 5-35).  Table 7.1 below sets out the hierarchical relationship between 
these PC&I. 
Table 7.1: Hierarchical framework for the assessment of governance quality (Cadman 
2011: 17) 
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Principle (level 1) Criterion (level 2) Indicator (level 
3) 
“Meaningful participation” Interest representation Inclusiveness 
Equality 
Resources 
Organisational responsibility Accountability 
Transparency 
“Productive deliberation” Decision making Democracy 
Agreement 
Dispute 
settlement 
Implementation Behavioural 
change 
Problem solving 
Durability 
(Cadman, 2009, p. 104) Note: text format denotes hierarchical level (Principle, Criterion, 
Indicator) 
This framework was used as the basis for a series of internet surveys, conducted between 
2010 and 2015, of stakeholders participating in REDD+ and CDM. See Table 7.2 below.  
  Table 7.2 Summary of survey questions 
Question Relevant  
Indicator 
Do you think [element] is inclusive of your interests? Inclusiveness 
Do you think [element] treats all interests equally? Equality 
What level of resources does [element] provide for you to 
participate? 
Resources 
Do you think the various institutional elements in which you 
participate are accountable in their dealings with you regarding 
the [element] process? 
Accountability 
Do you think the various institutional elements in which you 
participate are transparent in their dealings with you regarding 
the [element] process? 
Transparency 
Do you consider the [element] processes in which you participate 
to act in a democratic manner? 
Democracy 
Do you consider the making of agreements in [element] to be 
effective? 
Agreement 
Do you consider the settling of disputes in [element] to be Dispute 
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effective? settlement 
Do you think [element] will contribute to changing the behaviour 
that leads to deforestation and forest degradation in developing 
countries? 
Behavioural 
change 
Do you think [element] will help solve the problem of 
deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries? 
Problem solving 
Do you consider [element] will be durable? Durability 
(Cadman & Maraseni, 2013, p. 218; Cadman, Maraseni, Ma, & Lopez-Casero, 2017, p. 11). 
Note: Introductory materials and explanatory text not included 
Survey participants were recruited through internet-searches of publicly available 
participants’ lists relevant to UNFCCC, REDD+ and CDM. The ensuing email addresses 
were entered into a database, and the online survey tool SurveyMonkey 
(http://www.surveymonkey.net) was used to manage the survey. Survey participants were 
asked to rate the governance quality of REDD+, and the CDM. Survey respondents rated 
their perceptions of the governance quality by means of a five-point Likert scale, using the 
terms ‘very low’, ‘low’, ‘medium’, ‘high’ and ‘very high’. Participants were sent a survey, 
and provided the option of clicking on a link, which took them to the survey, or they could 
select an option to remove themselves from the list. In addition to the Likert-scale, 
respondents were invited to make substantive comments relevant to each indicator, and asked 
if they wished to be interviewed. The surveys were deployed for one month, with three 
(weekly) reminder emails, and a final forty-eight-hour closure notice. The surveys were 
anonymous, with confidentiality assured, but with the option for the lead researcher to 
identify individual respondents. 
The survey cohorts (and respondents) were comprised largely of members of the respective 
policy communities. Respondents were asked to identify as ‘Environmental’, ‘Social’, 
‘Economic’, ‘Government’, ‘Secretariat or other institutional component’, and ‘Other’ (who 
were then asked to specify further). Typically, these were government officials, 
representatives of intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations (environmental, 
social and economic), members of the elements under investigation (secretariats or other 
institutional components), and a few ‘others’, notably academics and researchers, and 
individuals who chose to represent themselves more specifically as ‘other’ (e.g. ‘private 
sector’ or ‘indigenous peoples’ organisation’). Respondents were also invited to identify 
whether they came from the ‘Global North’ or ‘Developed country’, and ‘Global South’ or 
‘Developing Country’. ‘Environment’ and ‘government’ were generally the highest 
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participating groups, followed by ‘other’, and with a smattering of ‘secretariat’, followed by 
‘social’ and ‘economic’. Generally speaking, North and South were relatively equally 
represented, with small numbers fluctuating either way in each of the surveys.  
Two initial surveys were deployed in 2010 for REDD+ (March) and the CDM (November), 
which were sent to approximately 800 email addresses for each mechanism. These links 
proved difficult for tracking respondents (especially if individuals forwarded the link). 
Subsequently a unique link for each individual respondent was used, generated by the online 
survey tool, and sent via email. The response rates from these surveys were very low, 
between three and four percent, although it should be noted that online surveys have 
generally lower participation rates than other forms of survey technique (Van Selm & 
Jankowski, 2006). Further addresses were added to the original survey cohorts to increase the 
number of responses, approximately 1,000 REDD+ and 1,300 for CDM (accounting for 
defunct emails and opting out). In the 2010 surveys, completion rates were lower than in 
2012 (45 out of 72 for CDM or 63%; and 44 out of 164 for REDD+ or 27 per cent). 
Subsequent to implementation of individual emails in 2012, completion rates were much 
higher at around ninety-five percent, although the overall number of respondents was lower 
(32 for CDM and 36 for REDD+). These numbers were not high enough to generate anything 
other than largely anecdotal results, particularly as the respondents across the two 
mechanisms were not homogenous, which the authors acknowledge, but the results, 
discussed below, are nevertheless interesting.  
In 2014, recognizing the need to refresh the existing databases of respondents, given the 
inevitable changes in the policy community over time, and to increase response rates, the 
researchers collected further emails of participants active in a range of climate and 
sustainability policy mechanisms, including CDM and REDD+, and combined them into a 
single cohort of approximately 5,300 potential respondents (accounting for defunct emails 
and opting out). A further category ‘academic’ was added to this survey on account of the 
number of ‘other’ respondents, who specified this sector from the 2010/2012 surveys when 
asked to clarify. This survey was deployed in February 2015, generating 107 completed 
responses out of 108 attempts: 90 of these respondents opted to evaluate CDM and REDD+. 
In the case of REDD+, 41 identified as ‘Global North’ (developed countries), 49 ‘Global 
South’ (developing country); for CDM 38 were from the North, 52 from the South. Again, it 
should be stressed that the respondents were not identical across mechanisms in the 2015 
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survey, but they were from the same initial pool of 107 respondents compared to the 
2010/2010 REDD+ and CDM respondents, which were completely different from each other. 
The combined results of these surveys are included in Table 7.3a) below. The results from the 
2015 survey are further presented by region (North/South) in Table 7.4) below. For 
assessment purposes, each responding sector was equally weighted to avoid numerical bias; 
this same approach was adopted for evaluation by region. 
Key Results 
  
Table 7.3 REDD+ and CDM quality of governance (2010-2015), all sectors combined (weighted average) 
Element, 
Date, 
Number 
Principle: Meaningful participation 
(Maximum score: 25; minimum score 5) 
Principle: Productive deliberation 
(Maximum score: 30; minimum score: 6) 
 
 
 
 
Tota
l 
(out 
of 
55) 
Criterion: Interest representation 
(Maximum score: 15; minimum score: 3) 
Criterion: Organisational 
responsibility (Max: 10; min: 2) 
 
 
 
Principle 
Score 
Criterion: Decision-making 
(Maximum score: 15; minimum score: 5) 
Criterion: Implementation 
(Maximum score: 15; minimum score: 3) 
 
 
 
Principle 
Score 
Indicators 
 
 
 
Score 
Indicators 
 
 
 
Score 
Indicators 
 
Score 
Indicators 
 
 
 
Score Inclusive. 
Equalit
y 
Resource
s 
Account
. 
Trans. Demo. 
Agree
. 
Disput
e 
 
Behavio
ur 
Problem 
Durabilit
y 
REDD+ 
Feb. 15 
(90) 
3.3 3.0 2.2 
8.5 
3.0 3.0 
6 14.5 
2.8 3.0 2.8 
8.6 
3.1 3.1 3.2 
9.4 18 32.5 
REDD+ 
Oct. 
2012 
(36) 
3.3 3.0 2.2 
8.5 
3.0 2.9 
5.9 14.4 
3.0 2.9 2.8 
8.7 
3.1 2.9 3.0 
9 17.7 32.1 
REDD+  
Mar. 
2010 
(38) 
3.8 3.4 2.0 
9.2 
3.1 3.4 
6.5 15.7 
3.4 2.8 2.8 
9 
3.7 3.5 3.8 
11 20 35.7 
CDM 
Feb. 
2015 
(90) 
2.8 2.7 2.0 
7.5 
3.0 2.9 
5.9 13.4 
2.7 2.9 2.7 
8.3 
2.8 2.7 2.8 
8.3 16.6 30 
CDM 
Nov. 
2012 
(32) 
3.6 3.0 2.4 
9 
3.5 3.3 
6.8 15.8 
3.2 3.3 3.2 
9.7 
3.5 3.1 2.8 
9.4 19.1 34.9 
CDM 
Nov. 
2010 
(45) 
3.0 2.3 2.4 
7.7 
2.7 2.7 
5.4 13.1 
2.7 2.9 2.6 
8.2 
2.8 2.6 2.8 
8.2 16.4 29.5 
REDD 
Overall 
3.5 3.1 2.1 8.7 3.1 3.1 6.2 14.9 3.1 2.9 2.8 8.8 3.3 3.2 3.3 9.8 18.6 33.5 
 Average 
CDM 
Overall  
Average 
3.1 2.7 2.3 
8.1 
3.1 3.0 
6.1 14.2 
2.9 3.0 2.8 
8.7 
3.0 2.8 2.8 
8.6 17.3 31.5 
 
Table 7.4 REDD+ and CDM quality of governance (2015), North and South (weighted average) 
Element, 
Date, 
Number 
Indicators 
Criterion 
score 
 
Indicators 
Criterion 
score 
 
 
Principle 
Score 
 
Indicators 
Criterion 
score 
 
 
Indicators 
 
Criterion 
score 
 
Principle 
Score 
 
Tota
l 
(out 
of 
55) 
 
Inclusive. 
Equalit
y 
Resource
s 
Account. Trans. Demo. 
Agree
. 
Disput
e 
Behavio
ur 
Problem 
Durabilit
y 
REDD+ 
Feb. 
2015 
North 
(41) 
3.7  2.9  1.6  
8.1 
2.8 2.7 
5.6 13.7 
2.5 2.8 2.5 
7.7 
3.1 2.9 3.1 
9.1 16.9 30.5 
REDD+ 
Feb. 
2015 
South 
(49) 
3.1 3.1 2.8 
9.0 
3.4 3.2 
6.6 15.6 
3.1 3.2 3.0 
9.3 
3.1 3.2 3.2 
9.5 18.8 34.4 
CDM 
Feb. 
2015 
North 
(38) 
3.0 2.7 1.6 
7.3 
2.7 2.7 
5.3 12.6 
2.4 2.8 2.3 
7.4 
2.7 2.4 2.6 
7.8 15.2 27.8 
CDM  
Feb. 
2015 
South 
(52) 
2.7 2.7 2.4 
7.8 
3.2 3.1 
6.3 14.1 
2.9 3.0 3.0 
8.9 
2.8 2.9 2.9 
8.6 17.4 31.5 
(Cadman et al., 2015; Maraseni & Cadman, 2015) 
Notes: 1) Light grey represents the highest-scoring indicators; 2) Medium-grey the lowest scoring indicators; 3) Numbers in bold are a ‘fail’ at the 
indicator level
 Commentary – 2015, 2012 and 21010 surveys of REDD+ and CDM  - combined results 
In the 2015 survey, REDD+ received a high ‘pass’. Inclusiveness was the highest rated 
indicator, and resources the lowest (a ‘fail’). The results from the 2012 survey – despite 
being from a largely different cohort of respondents – are remarkably similar to 2015: a 
slightly weaker ‘pass’, again with inclusiveness the highest rated indicator and resources the 
lowest (both exactly the same scores as the 2015 survey). The 2010 survey generated the 
most positive results: a low ‘credit’ (sixty five percent); the highest rating indicator was again 
inclusiveness but this time, shared with durability (3.8 – the highest two ratings across all 
surveys). The lowest indicator was once again resources (another ‘fail’). In the 2015 survey, 
CDM received a low ‘pass’. This time accountability was the highest rated indicator, with 
resources again the lowest (and a ‘fail’). The 2012 survey generated the most positive results 
for the mechanism, with a high ‘pass’ (sixty-four per cent). Inclusiveness was the highest 
rated indicator, resources the lowest (another ‘fail’). The 2010 survey was similar to that of 
2015: a low ‘pass’; with inclusiveness the highest rating indicator; but resources being 
outranked as the worst indicator by equality (2.3 cf. 2.4 – both ‘fails’). Overall, REDD+ 
clearly performed better than CDM, although interestingly, while REDD+ received the higher 
rating for inclusiveness (3.5.cf. 3.1), CDM had a slightly better rating for resources (2.1 cf. 
2.3 – both ‘fails’ nevertheless).  
Commentary – 2015 surveys of REDD+ and CDM – North and South 
REDD+ received a relatively high ‘pass’, but not a ‘credit’. The mechanism did pass all 
principles and criteria across North and Southern respondents however, with Southern 
respondents providing consistently higher ratings. Resources was again the weakest 
indicator, with Northern respondents providing a much lower rating than their Southern 
counterparts (1.6, a ‘fail’ cf. 2.8). Interestingly, the indicator ratings provided by Northern 
respondents were more dynamic than those from the South, and included the highest rated 
indicator (inclusiveness). With the exception of resources, Southern participants rated 
REDD+ governance indicators within the ‘high’ band, with little differentiation. For the 
South, accountability was the highest performing indicator. Respondents did not appear to 
be especially impressed with the CDM however, which received a low ‘pass’ only. Southern 
respondents rated the mechanism more favourably – a result that was repeated across both 
principles. Northern respondents identified interest representation and decision-making as 
the weakest criteria. At the indicator level, both South and North respondents gave resources 
 a low – ‘fail’ – score, and for Northern respondents, this was the lowest scoring indicator. 
Democracy and dispute settlement also received a low rating from the North (both ‘fails’). 
The highest performing indicators were inclusiveness (North) and agreement and dispute 
settlement (South). These higher ratings for agreement and dispute settlement are offset by 
a ‘fail’ for dispute settlement among Northern respondents (a ‘fail’). 
Conclusions 
The relative consistency of results for REDD+ and CDM across years and indicators is 
remarkable, particularly given the different sets of respondents, and response rates. With all 
scores exceeding thirty, and some exceeding thirty-five, it is a fair observation to say that 
overall, the perceptions of governance quality of REDD+ amongst respondents were positive. 
However, there were some inconsistencies in perceptions of governance quality between 
Northern and Southern respondents in the 2015 survey, with Northern respondents giving a 
considerably lower score than their Southern counterparts. CDM performed consistently more 
weakly than REDD+. The highest scoring indicator was generally ‘inclusiveness’, a positive 
sign, given the multi-stakeholder nature of climate governance (even if the nation-state remains 
dominant). Interestingly, there was some recognition given to CDM for its accountability 
(perhaps reflecting a degree of confidence in its robust accounting methods). However, it is 
alarming to note that, across years and elements, the lowest scoring indicator was ‘resources’ – 
the only exception being ‘equality’ for the 2010 CDM survey (which may reflect the generally 
poorer perception of CDM amongst respondents in comparison to REDD+).  
 
Given that resources, or capacity, are essential for interest representation, and meaningful 
participation, attention must be given to addressing this critical area of good governance, as 
inclusiveness is not in itself sufficient for ensuring good interest representation. Stakeholders 
require the capacity (financial, educational, technical, institutional, etc.) to ensure that their 
participation is meaningful, rather than tokenistic. In the planning, implementation and 
evaluation of mechanisms for combatting climate change, equitable allocation of resources for 
participation – both in policy development and in implementation – will be one of the principal 
challenges. This conclusion also informs the recent ‘procedural turn’ in the literature on climate 
justice, showing how vital resource-allocations are to secure the ideals laid down by 
deliberative justice. Participants need not only formal inclusion in deliberations about norms 
and policies, but the material and technical capabilities to make a genuine contribution. 
 Resources are also key in terms of implementation. Without improving livelihoods in a 
sustainable way, Indigenous and local communities may prefer to convert forests to other land 
uses, and developing countries may then struggle to meet their NDC targets. However, if the 
indications of developing country respondents in the 2015 survey are anything to go by, there 
may be a greater level of support for, and confidence in, the merits of such mechanisms in the 
Global South, than in the Global North.  
It should be further noted that the results were not entirely negative for CDM. Respondents felt 
that it had relatively good accountability mechanisms in place, although not markedly better 
than REDD+ (perhaps the latter has learned from CDM with its carbon accounting measures, 
although this remains to be seen). It is also worth noting that North respondents generally 
provided lower ratings for everything than South respondents, reflected in both CDM and 
REDD+. The consistently high ratings for inclusiveness compared to the low ratings for 
resources would appear to suggest that participants in both REDD+ and CDM felt that they had 
relatively good access to these mechanisms, but that the allocation of resources to facilitate 
participation is inadequate. The caveat should be added here that the surveys are capturing 
people on these forums’ participants’ lists, so they are by definition included at least to that 
extent. The value of measuring their perceptions nevertheless is that it allows a comparison 
between the two. The conclusion suggested is that REDD+ is more inclusive than CDM. 
If the SDM is to be successful, it needs to learn from the lessons of both REDD+ and the CDM, 
and pay greater attention to capacity building amongst under-resourced stakeholders. As these 
surveys have shown, the application of standards covering a broad suite of governance values, 
and not just focussing narrowly on accountability and transparency, should be seriously 
considered by donor countries and private sector investors, if they wish to ensure the integrity 
of climate governance, and its proper financing. It should give further attention to allocating 
resources to increase participation, and in sharing future benefits from reducing emissions in 
the effort to prevent dangerous climate change. Finally, the SDM should give thought to the 
underlying tensions between developed and developing country participants in climate 
governance. These could prove damaging in the future if they are not addressed immediately.  
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